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Chapter 2 
An Overview of Directive 95/46/EC in 
Relation to Medical Research 
Deryck Beyleveld' 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the provisions of Directive 95/46/EC with the use of personal 
data for medical research centrally in mind. The Directive makes no specific 
mention of medical research and, consequently, it contains no provisions for 
medical research as an explicitly delineated category. However, at times, the 
Directive refers to medical purposes (though medical research is not explicitly 
listed under this category) and there are provisions relating to the use of data 
relating to a person's health. It also refers to the use of personal data for scientific 
research or statistics. Consequently, this overview is an analytic construction from 
these related provisions together with any other of the Directive's provisions that 
could apply to medical research, including those of a wholly general nature that 
apply to any processing of personal data. 
The overview that follows represents my personal view, rather than the 
collective view of the participants in the PRIVIREAL project. It is presented here 
for the benefit of the general reader and also because it might assist in 
understanding the questions that participants were asked to address for the purpose 
of gathering the information for the comparative analysis presented in Chapters 10 
and 11. 
Objective of the Directive 
The purpose of Directive 95/46/EC is to enable the free flow of personal data from 
one European Union (EU) Member State to another for the purposes of the internal 
market by ensuring that fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals (in 
particular, privacy) are safeguarded (see Recitals 3 and 10 and Article 1(1)) and a 
high level of equivalent protection of these rights and freedoms is ensured in all the 
Member States (see Recitals 7 and 8). The Directive gives substance to and 
amplifies the fundamental rights and freedoms contained in the Council of Europe 
1 Privireal Co-ordinator. 
6 The Data Protection Directive and Medical Research Across Europe 
Convention of 28 January 1981 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data (see Recital 11). Since at least the Second 
Nold Case (Case-4173) [1974] E. C. R. 507, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has 
recognized, at least in principle, that violation of fundamental rights as 
fundamental principles of EC law (in which are included the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) of the 
Council of Europe [which is alluded to in Recital 10]), is sufficient to invalidate at 
least secondary Community Acts. 2 However, despite the fact that a commitment to 
fundamental rights and freedoms has subsequently been enshrined in Article 6 of 
the Treaty of European Union (the `Treaty of Maastricht'), it must not be forgotten 
that the EU does not have competence to legislate for fundamental rights and 
freedoms for their own sakes. The legal basis of EC law generally lies in the aim of 
constructing a single European market (and the legal basis of the Directive lies 
specifically in the aspect of the single market referred to as `the internal market'). 
Thus, the competence of the EU to legislate to protect fundamental freedoms and 
rights only arises for the reason that this protection is deemed necessary for 
achieving the purposes of the single market. For this reason (as well as for the 
reason that the Directive is concerned in its attention to fundamental rights and 
freedoms not only to protect privacy but all fundamental rights and freedoms to the 
extent that they may be interfered with in the use of personal data) 3 it can be 
misleading to refer, as is often done, to the Directive as `the Privacy Directive'. 
Article 1(2) asserts that Member States shall not restrict or prohibit the free 
flow of personal data between themselves for reasons connected with the 
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. However, this does not mean that 
the Directive is essentially concerned with legislating a balance between 
fundamental rights and freedoms and economic objectives of the internal market 
(let alone that the purpose of free flow between Member States overrides all 
considerations of fundamental rights and freedoms). Instead, adequate 
safeguarding of fundamental rights and freedoms must be viewed as a condition of 
the free flow of personal data, in line with which Article 1(2) signifies, primarily, 
that if a Member State (A) implements the Directive correctly then another 
Member State (B) may not restrict or prohibit the flow of personal data from B to 
A because B does not consider the level of protection for fundamental rights and 
freedoms provided by A's implementation to be adequate (see Recital 9). 
Presumably, it also means that if B does not consider that A provides the protection 
required by the Directive, then B may not restrict or prohibit the flow of personal 
2 Manfred A. Dauses, The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Community Legal 
Order' (1985) 10 European Law Review 398-419, at 407, argues (on the basis of Articles 53 
and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, according to which any 
treaty is void if it violates a peremptory norm of general international law) that, in theory, 
violation of at least some fundamental rights is sufficient to invalidate even the European 
Treaty itself. However, it must be remembered that the ECJ has no jurisdiction to rule on the 
validity of the Treaty (see Article 234 EC (ex Article 177)). 
3 This is because the words 'in particular privacy' in Article 1(1) mean 'especially privacy' 
not 'only privacy'. 
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data from B to A on that ground either (but should refer the matter to the 
Commission or the ECJ). This, however, is not to say that the Directive is not 
concerned with a balance between economic objectives and the protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. However, such a balance is best viewed, in my 
opinion, as `internal' to the activity of protecting fundamental rights and freedoms 
rather than as signifying a conflict between the protection of fundamental rights 
and freedoms as such and other factors. This is because to view the matter 
`internally' is to observe that, e. g., Article 8(1) (the right to private and family life) 
of the ECHR may be derogated from in terms laid down by Article 8(2) ECHR, 
and relevant considerations include the economic well-being of the country, and 
may include economic objectives more generally to the extent that they serve, e. g., 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, or the public interest. To view the 
matter `externally', on the other hand, requires the objectives of the internal market 
to be seen as in conflict with the entire framework set up by, e. g., Article 8(1) 
together with Article 8(2), which is both unnecessary and not consistent with the 
concept of a fundamental right or freedom. 
Definition of Personal Data and Scope of the Directive 
The Directive defines personal data as any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person ('data subject') (see Article 2(a); Recital 26), and this 
includes `sound and image data relating to natural persons' (see Recital 14). An 
identifiable person is, in turn, defined as a person who can be identified directly or 
indirectly from the data in conjunction with other factors (see Article 2(a)) `likely 
reasonably to be used' by any person (see Recital 26-which also specifies that 
codes of conduct under Article 27 may provide guidance about when data have 
been rendered anonymous). 
Recital 26 states that the principles of data protection (see below) apply to all 
personal data (within the scope of the Directive), but that they do not apply to data 
that have been rendered anonymous so as to render the data subject no longer 
identifiable (i. e. that has rendered the data non-personal). That data remains 
personal if any person is reasonably likely to be able to identify the data, seems to 
imply that data are not to be considered anonymous for the purposes of processing 
by a data controller (whom Article 2(d) defines as any person or body (private or 
public) that individually or jointly determines the purposes and means of 
processing) who cannot identify the data subject directly or indirectly from the data 
if any other person is reasonably likely to be able to identify the data subject 
directly or indirectly. If so, the circumstances in which data may be considered 
anonymous are extremely limited. However, precisely when data may be 
considered to be rendered anonymous and whether (and to what extent) processing 
of data in anonymous form that has been collected in personal form falls under the 
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Directive are highly controversial matters. (Anonymization is discussed in Chapter 
4-and see also Deryck Beyleveld and David Townend 2004.4) 
`Natural person' is not defined. However, by stating that national legislation 
concerning the processing of personal data relating to legal persons is not affected 
by the Directive, Recital 24 suggests that a natural person is a person who is not a 
legal person. Processing of personal data covers anything that can be done with 
personal data automatically or manually (see Articles 2(b) and 3(1); Recital 27). 
However, the Directive only covers manual processing if the data are part of or 
intended to be part of a `filing system' (see Article 3; Recital 15), which is defined 
as a `structured set of personal data which are accessible according to specific 
criteria' (see Article 2(c); Recitals 15 and 27). Member States may define these 
criteria (see Recital 27). The Directive also does not cover processing of personal 
data for purposes that fall outside of the scope of EC law or processing by a natural 
person for purely personal or household purposes (see Article 3(2); Recitals 12,13 
and 16). 
Situations in which Member States must apply their national law 
implementing the Directive are specified in Article 4 (and see Recitals 18-21). 
Limits on Member States' Discretion in Implementing the Directive 
Member States have a degree of discretion as to the conditions of lawful 
processing under national law. However, this discretion is limited by Articles 6-21, 
with which national laws must be compatible (see Article 5; Recital 22). 
Implementation may be by means of a general law or different laws for different 
types or `sectors' of processing (see Recital 23). 
Principles of Data Protection 
Article 6(1) (see also Recital 28) lays down five principles of data protection, 
which are that personal data must be 
processed fairly and lawfully (see Article 6(1)(a)); 
collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes (which, according to 
Recital 28, must be determined at the time of collection of the data) and not 
further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes (see Article 
6(1)(b)) as originally specified (see Recital 28); 
- adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they 
are collected/further processed (see Article 6(1)(c)); 
4 Deryck Beyleveld and David Townend `When is Personal Data Rendered Anonymous? 
Interpreting Recital 26 of Directive 95/46/EC' (2004) 6 Medical Law international 2: 73- 
86. 
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accurate and, where necessary, kept complete and up to date (see Article 
6(1)(d)); 
not be kept in a personally identifiable form for longer than necessary for the 
purposes for which they were collected or (compatibly) further processed (see 
Article 6(1)(e)). 
Article 6(2) requires Member States to impose responsibility for compliance with 
the data protection principles on the data controller (see also Recital 25). 
Regarding the 2d principle, further processing for historical, statistical and 
scientific purposes is not incompatible provided that Member States provide 
appropriate safeguards (see Article 6(1)(b)), which `must, in particular, rule out the 
use of the data in support of measures or decisions regarding any particular 
individual' (see Recital 29). Regarding the 5t' principle, for these purposes and 
under appropriate safeguards, personal data may be kept for longer than necessary 
for the purposes for which it was originally collected (see Article 6.1(e)). 
The i principle can be viewed broadly or narrowly. Viewed broadly, for 
processing to be lawful, all the requirements of the Directive imposed on 
processing must be complied with. Thus viewed, compliance with the 2d, 3`d, 4`s 
and 5`h principles is necessary to satisfy the 1u principle, as is compliance with 
Articles 7-21. Viewed narrowly, only some of the requirements for lawful 
processing under the Directive as a whole are requirements for lawful processing in 
relation to the 1 s` principle specifically, and the wording of Recitals 30-36 (in 
particular, Recital 31) suggests that these are the requirements of Articles 7 and 8, 
while Recital 38 suggests that the requirements of Articles 10 and 11 are the 
Directive's specific requirements of fair processing. 
However, whichever way the matter is viewed, satisfaction of the conditions 
specified under Article 7 `Criteria for Making Data Processing Legitimate' and 
Article 8 `Special Categories of Processing' (see below), cannot be taken to be 
sufficient to render processing lawful under the Directive as a whole. Articles 6-21 
all set (where applicable, given the nature of the personal data and processing, and 
taking into account exemptions) requirements that are hurdles to be overcome to 
render processing lawful. For processing to be lawful under the Directive as a 
whole, all the applicable hurdles must be overcome. 
Necessary Conditions for Legitimate Processing of Personal Data and 
Sensitive Personal Data 
Article 7 (see also Recital 30), which applies to all personal data, can be satisfied 
in six different ways 
a. by obtaining the unambiguous consent of the data subject, `consent' being 
defined by Article 2(h) as `any freely given specific and informed indication 
of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal 
data relating to him being processed'; or 
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b. if processing is necessary to perform or enter a contract to which the data 
subject is party; or 
c. if processing is necessary to comply with a legal obligation of the data 
controller; or 
d. if processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject 
(which Recital 31 reveals to be interests `essential for the data subject's life'); 
or 
e. if processing is necessary in the public interest or in the exercise of official 
authority (in relation to which Recital 32 states that national legislation may 
determine who the controller performing a task carried out in the public 
interest should be); or 
f. if processing is in the legitimate interests of the controller or recipients of the 
data (unless protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data 
subject is overriding) (with Recital 30 explaining that Member States may 
specify when this condition is satisfied). 
With regard to Article 7(e) and 7(f) at least, Article 14(a) (see also Recital 45) 
specifies that these conditions may not be appealed to unless the data subject is 
given the opportunity to object on compelling legitimate grounds, unless 
`otherwise provided by national legislation'. 
Article 8 applies to what Recital 34 calls `sensitive categories' of personal 
data, which Recital 33 characterizes as `data which are capable by their nature of 
infringing fundamental freedoms or privacy'. Article 8 specifies such data as 
`revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical 
beliefs, trade-union membership, and ... 
data concerning health or sex life'. 
Article 8(1) prohibits the processing of such data, unless certain conditions are 
satisfied (see Article 8(2)(a)-(e) and 8(3)-8(5); and Recitals 33-36). For the 





with the `explicit consent' of the data subject (see also Recital 
33) (which is not defined in the Directive) (unless national law 
does not permit the prohibition to be lifted by the data subject's 
consent); or 
where processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the 
data subject or another person where the data subject physically 
or legally cannot give consent; or 
the processing is of data manifestly made public by the data 
subject or that is necessary to establish, exercise or defend a legal 
claim; or 
where the processing is necessary for the purposes of `preventive 
medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of care or treatment 
or the management of health-care services, and where those data 
are processed by a health professional subject under national law 
or rules established by national competent bodies to the 
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obligation of professional secrecy or by another person also 
subject to an equivalent obligation of secrecy' (see also Recital 
33); or 
Article 8(4) subject to suitable safeguards (which, according to Recital 34, 
must also be specific) specified by national law or the decision of 
the Supervisory Authority in the substantial public interest 
(which decisions must, per Article 8(6), be notified to the 
Commission) (with regard to which Recital 34 identifies 
scientific research and government statistics as an important 
reason of public interest that might justify processing of sensitive 
categories of data). (The concept of `public interest' in the 
Directive is discussed in Chapter 7. ) 
Article 8(7) provides that Member States must determine when personal data may 
be processed employing a national identification number or any other identifier of 
general application. 
Because Article 7 applies to all personal data, it is obvious that it is necessary 
for the processing of sensitive personal data that at least one condition from Article 
7 as well as one condition from Article 8 be met. However, it is also obvious that 
meeting some of the conditions in Article 8 will automatically meet a condition in 
Article 7. So, for example, meeting the condition of explicit consent in Article 8 
will also meet the condition of consent in Article 7. 
Nothing in the Directive states explicitly that any condition in Article 7 takes 
priority over any other; and the same must be said about the conditions in Article 
8(2). Nevertheless, it is arguable, at least where the processing of sensitive 
personal data is concerned, that the conditions in Article 8(2) and those in Article 7 
are not entirely open alternatives. This is because the European Court of Human 
Rights (whose judgments, while not binding on the European Court of Justice, are 
taken very seriously by the latter) has ruled that to process sensitive personal data 
without consent is by the very nature of the case an interference with the right to 
S private life under Article 8(1) of the ECHR. Of course, interference with the right 
5 See the case of M. S. t. Sweden 28 EHRR 313, paragraphs 34-35: 
'34. The applicant and the Commission, stressing that information of a private and sensitive 
nature had been disclosed without her consent to a certain number of people at the Office, 
maintained that the measure constituted an interference [with her right to private life under 
Article 8.1 ]'. 
35. The Court notes that the medical records in question contained highly personal and 
sensitive data about the applicant, including information relating to an abortion. Although 
the records remained confidential, they had been disclosed to another public authority and 
therefore to a wider circle of public servants (see paragraphs 12-13 above). Moreover. 
whilst the information had been collected and stored at the clinic in connection with medical 
treatment, its subsequent communication had served a different purpose, namely to enable 
the Office to examine her compensation claim. It did not follow from the fact that she had 
sought treatment at the clinic that she would consent to the data being disclosed to the Office 
(see paragraph 10 above). Having regard to these considerations, the Court finds that the 
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to private life can be justified (as stated in Article 8(2) ECHR) if done in 
accordance with the law when `necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others'. 
6 However, this implies that 
consent must be obtained unless to do so would be impracticable/involve 
disproportionate effort or be otherwise inappropriate (e. g., because to do so would 
threaten the overriding rights of others). Consequently, it is at least arguable (and 
seems to me to be the case) that satisfaction of the conditions laid down by Articles 
7 and 8(2) in ways that do not involve the consent of the data subject at least 
implicitly (as is the case, e. g., with the condition of being for a contract binding on 
the data subject) requires the obtaining of consent to be impracticable, etc. Only in 
the case of Article 8(2)(c) does it seem to me that this complex requirement will be 
satisfied automatically. 
Provisions Relating to Journalism, Art and Literary Expression 
Article 9 (see also Recital 37) permits exemptions or derogations from the 
Directive's requirements for processing `carried out solely for journalistic purposes 
or the purpose of artistic or literary expression' but only if this is necessary `to 
reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing freedom of expression'. The 
relevance of this to medical research should be extremely limited. 
Duty to Provide Information to the Data Subject 
As a means to the protection of data subjects' rights to fundamental rights and 
freedoms, the Directive grants data subjects specific rights. In my opinion, first and 
foremost amongst these are the rights to information specified in Articles 10 and 
11 (see also Recitals 38-40), which Recital 38 refers to as conditions of fair 
processing, which links these Articles to the is` data protection principle. Granted, 
the Directive does not describe the provisions of Articles 10 and 11 as rights of the 
data subject, but as duties of the data controller. However, because failure to carry 
out the applicable duty will interfere with the data subjects' specific rights, from a 
logical point of view these provisions may be characterized as rights, and the main 
effect of them being characterized as duties of the data controller is to indicate that 
the data controller's duty does not rest on the data subject making any claim: i. e., 
the information needs to be provided without the data subject having to make a 
request for it. 
Article 10 (see also Recital 38) covers the case where data are being collected 
from the data subject, whereas Article 11 covers cases where the data have not 
disclosure of the data by the clinic to the Office entailed an interference with the applicant's 
right to respect for private life guaranteed by paragraph I of Article 8. ' 
6 As, indeed, the European Court of Human Rights found in M. S. v Sweden. 
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been obtained from the data subject. In both cases, the data controller or `his 
representative' must provide the data subject with information (except where he 
already has it) about the identity of the data controller and his representative (if 
any). In the case of Article 10, the data subject must also be informed about the 
intended purposes of the processing, whereas in the case of Article 11, the data 
subject must be informed of the purposes for which data have been or are to be 
disclosed. In both cases, the data subject must be given any other information 
required for the processing to be fair. Examples are given. In both cases, the 
recipients or categories of recipients, and the existence of the right of access to and 
the right to rectify the data concerning the data subject (granted by Article 12) are 
mentioned. In the case of Article 11, the requirement to provide this information 
may be lifted, in particular for statistical purposes or purposes of historical or 
scientific research, if the provision of information would be impossible or involve 
disproportionate effort or if recording or disclosure of the data is expressly laid 
down by law (see also Recital 40), subject to Member States providing adequate 
safeguards. However, information provision that falls under Article 10 is not 
explicitly stated to be open to such derogation. While Recitals 38-40 are, at least at 
first sight, ambiguous as to whether the derogations specified in Recital 40 apply to 
both the Recital 39 case (obtaining from the data subject) and the Recital 39 case 
(other cases) or only to the Recital 39 case, the fact that these derogations are only 
mentioned in connection with Article I1 in the operative part of the Directive 
indicates strongly that they apply only to the Recital 39/Article I1 case. 
It is not at all clear whether Article 10 covers the case of a person who 
obtained personal data from the data subject and now wishes to use the data for a 
purpose or to make disclosures that the data subject was not informed about at the 
time that the data were obtained. The case for saying that it does is that Recital 38 
states that purposes must be specified at the time of collection. However, Recital 
39 states that exemptions parallel to those provided by Article 11(2) to Article 
11(1) apply to disclosures that were not anticipated at the time of the collection. 
This creates considerable difficulties of interpretation, which I discuss in Chapter 
6. 
The reason why Articles 10 and 11 are at the core of the protection provided 
by the Directive is not only that information about the identity of the data 
controller, etc., is needed for data subjects to be able to exercise the other specific 
rights that the Directive grants them. If consent of the data subject is, at least as a 
matter of first presumption, necessary to satisfy the Article 7/8(2) requirement for 
legitimate processing in connection with sensitive personal data, then, because 
consent must be informed, information provision is necessary to satisfy the Article 
7/8(2) requirement as well. 
Power to Exempt from Article 10 and Other Provisions via Article 13(1) 
Although there is no derogation from Article 10 explicitly specified within Article 
10, it should, however, be noted that Article 13(1) provides for derogation from 
Articles 6(1), 10,11(1), 12, and 21 (which imposes a duty on Member States to 
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publicize processing operations) to the extent that this is necessary to safeguard 
various goals (e. g., national security, defence, the detection and prosecution of 
crime, taxation policy) that are beyond the remit of EC law (see also Recitals 43 
and 44), or (Article 13(1)(g)) to protect the data subject or the rights and freedoms 
of others (see also Recital 42 in relation to the rights of Articles 10,11 and 12). 
(Related to this, Recital 70 states that the Directive allows the principle of public 
access to official documents [which reflects the ECHR Article 10(1) right to 
freedom of expression, because this includes the freedom to receive information] to 
be taken into account when implementing the principles set out in the Directive. ) 
It is important to note, however, that Article 28(4) requires Member States to 
provide for each national Supervisory Authority to hear, in particular, `claims for 
checks on the lawfulness of data processing lodged by any person when the 
national provisions pursuant to Article 13' of the Directive apply. 
Data Subjects' Right of Access on Request 
Article 12 (see also Recital 41) grants a `right of access', which includes rights to 
obtain from the data controller 
confirmation as to whether or not data relating to him or her are being 
processed and, if so, information at least about the purposes of the processing, 
the categories of data being processed, and the recipients or categories of 
recipients to whom the data have been disclosed; 
intelligible communication of what data are being processed and about the 
source of this data; 
knowledge of the logic behind any automated processing at least if covered by 
Article 15(1); 
- rectification, erasure or blocking of data if its processing does not comply with 
the Directive (especially on the grounds of inaccuracy or incompleteness); 
notification to third parties to whom data has been disclosed of the exercise of 
the last mentioned right (unless this is impossible or would involve 
disproportionate effort). 
In relation to the modification of Article 12 permitted by Article 13(1)(g), Recital 
42 specifically indicates that Member States may require the data subject's right of 
access to medical data to be exercised only through a health professional. Article 
12 is also subject to derogation via Article 13(2) `when data are processed solely 
for the purposes of scientific research or are kept in personal form for a period that 
does not exceed the period necessary for the sole purpose of creating statistics', 
provided that 
- the derogation is by a legislative measure; 
`there is clearly no risk of breaching the privacy of the data subject'; and 
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adequate legal safeguards are provided (in particular that the data are not used 
to take measures or decisions regarding any particular individual). 
Data Subjects' Rights to Object 
Article 14(a) grants a right to object to processing on legitimate grounds (as 
already mentioned in connection with Article 7) and Article 14(b) grants a right to 
object to processing for the purposes of direct marketing. Whereas the Article 
14(a) right may be removed by national legislation, the Article 14(b) may not and 
data subjects must be informed of this right (the exercise of which must be free of 
charge and [see Recital 30] does not require reasons to be given) either whenever 
the data controller envisages the data being processed for direct marketing or 
before such processing or disclosure to third parties for such processing occurs. 
Data Subjects' Right to Object to Decisions Based Solely on Automated 
Processing 
Article 15 (as already alluded to in connection with Article 12) grants data subjects 
a right not to be subjected to decisions that produce legal effects on them or 
otherwise significantly affect them, which are based solely on automated 
processing that is intended to evaluate personal aspects of the data subject (unless 
certain conditions are satisfied). 
Powers to Exempt for Research 
The extent to which the Directive permits Member States to exempt medical 
research from various requirements set by the Directive is (as a category of 
scientific research/use for statistics) specified at least by Article 13(2), together 
with Articles 6(1)(b), 6(1)(e), and 8(4) (given that Recital 34 specifies scientific 
research, amongst other things, is an important public interest). In addition, where 
processing was already under way before the Directive entered into force (24 
October 1998), Article 32(3) permits Member States to provide, on condition that 
they institute appropriate safeguards, that the processing of data for the sole 
purpose of `historical research' (which category is not defined, in particular in 
relation to research for historical purposes, which is mentioned in Article 6(1)(b)) 
need not comply with Articles 6,7 and 8. To this might possibly be added the 
derogations permitted under Article 8(3) (but only to the extent that medical 
research may be considered to be a subcategory of preventive medicine, medical 
diagnosis, the provision of care or treatment, or management of health-care 
services) and the derogation under Article 13(1)(g) (but only to the extent that 
medical research is necessary to safeguard the data subject or the rights and 
freedoms of others). (The power to exempt for research is discussed in Chapter 5. ) 
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Need for Processing to Have the Consent of the Data Controller 
According to Article 16, those who are authorized by the data controller to hold or 
otherwise process data must do so only on the instructions of the data controller 
unless required to do so by law. (See also Article 17(3), which further specifies that 
processors who are not themselves the data controllers must be bound by a contract 
or legal act binding them to the controller. Per Article 17(4), the contract must be 
in writing or equivalent form. ) 
security 
Article 17(1) and (2) (see also Recital 46) further requires Member States to 
provide that the data controller must implement appropriate security measures. 
Notification to the Supervisory Authority 
Article 18 concerns notification of processing to the Supervisory Authority that 
must be set up under Article 28 (see also Recitals 48-52). Article 18(1) requires 
Member States to require the data controller (or his representative) to notify the 
Supervisory Authority before carrying out any automatic or partly automatic 
processing. Article 18(5) permits Member States to require notification to the 
Supervisory Authority of non-automatic processing. Article 18(2) and (3) permits 
Member States to simplify or exempt from notification (the contents of which are 
specified by Article 19) under specified conditions, the most important of which 
where data processed for medical research is concerned is that the data controller, 
operating in compliance with national law, appoints a personal data protection 
official who is responsible, in particular, for ensuring in an independent manner the 
application of national provisions implementing the Directive and for keeping a 
register of processing operations as required by Article 21(2). Recital 51, 
importantly, specifies that simplification or exemption from notification does not 
exempt the data controller from any of the other obligations resulting form the 
Directive. 
In addition to information about the identity of the data controller, the 
purposes of processing, data subjects, categories of data processed and recipients 
of data, Article 19(1) requires information about proposed transfers of data to 
countries outside the European Economic Area (EEA) (which is the EU plus 
Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway) and a general description of a preliminary 
assessment of the security measures required under Article 17. 
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Requirement for Prior Checking of Processing Presenting Specific Risks to 
Rights and Freedoms of the Data Subject 
Article 20(1) and (2) requires Member States to determine which processing 
operations are likely to present specific risks to the rights and freedoms of data 
subjects (about which Recital 53 provides some examples) and to subject these to 
prior checking by the Supervisory Authority or a Data Protection Official (who 
must consult the Supervisory Authority if in any doubt), and Article 20(3) permits 
member States to carry out such checks when preparing legislation that lays down 
appropriate safeguards for such processing operations. (See also Recital 54. ) 
Requirement to Publicize Processing Operations 
Except in the case of public registers, Article 21 requires Member States to take 
measures to publicize all processing operations. For processing that requires 
notification per Article 18, a register must be kept by the Supervisory Authority 
that contains all the information required per Article 19(1) except that concerning a 
description of a preliminary assessment. Where notification is not required, 
Member States must ensure that this same information is available to any person 
on request. 
Requirement to Provide Compensation for Damage Caused by Unlawful 
Processing 
The Directive requires Member States, without prejudice to any administrative 
remedy, to provide for a judicial remedy for any breach of rights guaranteed by 
implementing national legislation (Article 22); to provide for compensation from 
the data controller for damage as a result of unlawful processing operations (except 
where the controller can prove that he was not responsible for the event causing the 
damage) (Article 23); and to adopt suitable measures to ensure full implementation 
of the provisions of the Directive, which must include sanctions for infringing 
these provisions (Article 24). (See also Recital 55. ) 
Transfer of Personal Data Outside the EEA 
Articles 25 and 26 concern transfer of personal data to `third countries' (i. e., 
countries outside the EEA). Personal data may not be transferred to a third country 
that does not provide for an adequate level of protection (Article 25(1); Recitals 56 
and 57) unless with the unambiguous consent of the data subject; or when 
necessary for the performance of contractual measures between the data controller 
and the data subject, or at the data subject's request; or in the interest of the data 
subject in a contract between the controller and a third party; or when necessary or 
legally required on important public interest grounds or to exercise or defend legal 
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claims; or when necessary in the vital interests of the data subject; or from a public 
register (Article 26(1); Recital 58). Alternatively, Member States may authorize 
transfers where the data controller adduces adequate safeguards by e. g., 
appropriate contracts (Article 26(2); Recital 59), in relation to which the 
Commission may, in accordance with Article 31(2), decide that certain standard 
contractual clauses constitute sufficient safeguards, with which Member States 
must comply (Article 26(4)). Article 25(2) specifies considerations that Member 
States must take into account in assessing the adequacy of protection in a third 
country. Member States and the Commission must inform each other of countries 
they consider do not provide adequate protection (Article 25(3)). If the 
Commission does not consider protection in a third country to be adequate, 
Member States must act to prevent transfers of data of the type for which 
protection is not adequate to that country (Article 25(4)), while the Commission 
must act to try to remedy this situation (Article 25(5); Recital 59). The 
Commission may find, in accordance with Article 31(2), that a third country 
provides adequate protection, and then the Member States must comply with this 
decision (Article 25(6)). These matters are of special relevance in the case of 
personal data processed for medical research, because this research is often 
sponsored by companies based outside of the EEA, and, as Recital 60 indicates, 
non-compliance with the standards set by Article 8 of the Directive (which deals 
with sensitive personal data specifically) is of particular concern in relation to third 
countries. (As regards the powers of the Commission with regard to the transfer of 
data to third countries, see Recital 66, which makes reference to Council Decision 
87/373/EEC. ) 
Codes of Conduct 
Article 27(1) (see also Recital 61) requires Member States and the Commission to 
encourage the drawing up of codes of conduct to assist with the implementation of 
the Directive in specific sectors of processing. The Supervisory Authority is 
required to vet codes drawn up by bodies representing categories of data 
controllers and to consult with data subjects or their representatives (Article 27.2). 
Article 27(3) provides a role for the Article 29 Working Party in approving draft 
Community Codes and amendments to existing Community codes. 
Requirement for and Role of a Supervisory Authority 
Article 28 requires each Member State to provide for one or more public 
authorities ('the Supervisory Authority'), which must act in complete 
independence (see also Recital 62), and which (see also Recitals 63 and 64) 
is responsible for monitoring compliance with national measures 
implementing the Directive (Article 28(1)); 
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must be consulted when administrative and regulatory measures to implement 
the Directive are drawn up (Article 28(2)); 
must be given investigative powers, effective powers of intervention, and the 
power to engage in legal proceedings regarding violations of the national 
implementing laws (the exercise of which powers may, however, be appealed 
through the courts) (Article 28(3)); 
must hear claims lodged by any data subject or association representing a data 
subject, and when Member States are employing their powers under Article 13 
must hear claims for checks on lawfulness of processing lodged by any person 
(in relation to which they must at least inform the person that a check has 
taken place) (Article 28(4)); 
must draw up and publish a regular report on its activities (Article 28(5)); 
may be asked to exercise its powers by the Authority of another Member State 
and must co-operate with the Supervisory Authorities in the other Member 
States insofar as this is necessary for it to carry out its duties (Article 28(6)). 
The staff of the Supervisory Authority must be made subject to a duty of 
professional secrecy with regard to confidential information, which must continue 
after they have ceased to be employed by the authority (Article 28(7)). 
Article 29 Working Party 
Article 29 (see also Recital 65) sets up an advisory, independent, Working Party on 
the Protection of Individuals with respect to the Processing of Personal Data, and 
specifies the composition and modus operandi of the Working Party. The remit of 
the Working Party is (see Article 30(1); Recital 65) to 
examine any question concerning proper implementation of the Directive in 
relation to contributing to the Directives aim of ensuring harmonized 
protection within the EU; 
provide an opinion to the Commission on the level of protection in third 
countries; 
advise the Commission on any proposed amendments to the Directive or 
additional proposed Community measures affecting the rights and freedoms of 
individuals with respect to the processing of personal data; and 
give opinions on codes of conduct drawn up at Community level. 
The Working Party's findings on any lack of harmonization must be reported to the 
Commission (Article 30(2)), and the Working Party may make recommendations 
on its own initiative (Article 30(3)). The Working Party's opinions and 
recommendations must be forwarded to the Commission and the Article 31 
Committee (Article 30(4)). The Commission must make a report on action it takes 
on any of these opinions or recommendations to the Working Party, the European 
Parliament and the Council (Article 30(5)), which must be made public. Finally, 
the Working Party must make an annual report to the European Parliament and the 
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Council on the level of protection in Member States and third countries, which 
must be made public (Article 30(6)). 
Article 31 Committee 
Article 31 provides that the Commission is to be assisted by a Committee when it 
proposes to take Community measures. If the Committee agrees (by a majority in 
accordance with Article 148(2) of the European Treaty) to the measures proposed, 
they apply immediately. Otherwise, the Commission must submit the measures to 
the Council (which has 3 months to take a different decision by a qualified 
majority). It seems from Recital 68 that one of the specific purposes of Article 31 
is to enable the Commission to supplement or clarify the principles of the Directive 
by making specific rules based on those principles for specific sectors. Thus, for 
example, it is possible, in principle, that the Commission might use Article 31 to 
implement specific community measures for the use of personal data for medical 
research. 
Deadlines for Implementation and Powers to Make Transitional Exemptions 
Article 32(1) requires Member States to have implemented the Directive within 3 
years of its adoption (which was on 24 October 1995, hence by 24 October 1998). 
According to Article 32(2), by 24 October 2001, all processing already underway 
by 24 October 1998 must comply with the provisions of the Directive, except that 
Member States may delay conformity with Articles 6,7 and 8 until 24 October 
2007 in the case of processing of data already held in manual filing systems on 24 
October 1998. (This implies that data can be subject to processing already 
underway when it is not already held; but this is not explained. In relation to 
medical research, one possibility is that data collected from a person after 23 
October 1998, thus not held on 24 October 1998, for a project that began 
processing data on other persons before 24 October 1998, is to be considered being 
subject to processing already under way by 24 October 1998; but other 
interpretations may be possible. ) This transitional exemption does not, however, 
extend to the rights under Article 12. (However, according to Recital 69, if data 
kept in existing manual filing systems is processed during the extended transition 
period applicable to them, `those systems must be brought into conformity with 
these provisions at the time of such processing'. ) According to Article 32(3), 
subject to the provision of suitable safeguards, Member States may permanently 
exempt data already held in manual filing systems before 24 October 1998 from 
Articles 6,7 and 8, where the data are kept for the sole purpose of historical 
research. 
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Review of the Directive by the Commission 
Article 33 requires the Commission to report to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the implementation of the Directive at regular intervals, beginning 
no later than 24 October 2001, and the reports must be made public. It requires the 
Commission, in particular, to keep under review the application of the Directive to 
the processing of sound and image data relating to natural persons and to submit 
any proposals that are rendered necessary by advances in information technology. 
Responsibility to Implement the Directive 
Article 34 addresses the Directive to the Member States. All EC Directives (as 
against EC Regulations) require implementation by the Member States and do not 
generally impose duties directly on private persons or bodies. However, under the 
doctrine of direct effect developed by the ECJ, once the deadline for 
implementation has passed, provisions of a Directive that are sufficiently clear and 
unambiguous to be applied directly by the domestic courts apply directly in the 
absence of implementing legislation and take precedence over any conflicting 
legislation. 7 If the domestic courts refuse to apply such provisions directly, 8 then 
the Member States are liable to penalties. 9 
' See, e. g., the second Simmenthal case, Case 106/77, [1978] E. C. R 629. 
8 That they are required to do so, at least if possible, was established in Von Colson and 
Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (Case 14/83) [1984] E. C. R. 1891. 
9 See Wagner Miret v. Fondo de Guarantia Salaria (C-334/92), [1993] E. C. R. 1-6911. 
